Monday, May 26, 2008

Two Cousins, Ten Questions

I would like to draw your attention to the following blog (click the post title to be redirected). Please read the following description and hopefully you'll check us out.

About the Project
Two Cousins, Ten Questions is a summer debate project started by two cousins from Canton, Ohio. The discussion will be based on the Chicago Tribune's tongue-in-cheek, ten question foreign policy test for any prospective presidential candidate. The questions can be found in the original article here. We intend to devote one week to a careful discussion of each question.

This project started as an effort between two cousins (us) with very different political views to engage in a civilized, reasoned debate on issues that we care passionately about - and that are crucial topics in the 2008 presidential election. In case you're unfamiliar with us, Ryan intends to vote for John McCain while Josh is currently supporting Barack Obama. After vigorous discussions (via Facebook, e-mails, and our personal blogs) concerning hot-button issues such as abortion, the Iraq war, religion, and politics, we decided to start the blog to facilitate a more open discourse on American foreign policy.

Here's how we hope everything will play out: At the start of each week we'll each post our individual response (approximately 1000 words) to the week's question. After both answers are posted, we'll begin a debate between the two of us, and open a thread for our visitors to post their answer to the question, respond to our answers, and debate with other visitors and ourselves.

At the end of the week, we'll each finish everything up by posting a short (no more than 300 words) closing argument. When Sunday rolls around, we'll start over again and head onto the next question.

One final note - we've deemed a couple of the questions (#4 and #7) inappropriate for our purposes and are looking to replace these with better debate questions. Please send us your suggestions and we'll read through them and choose a few replacements. Please help make this blog a success by contributing to the discussions, responses, and analysis. We both hope to provide a forum for discussion over one of the most important issues (foreign policy) in the upcoming November presidential elections and would greatly appreciate your help!

http://twocousinstenquestions.blogspot.com/

Withdraw Now!

To open, I do not believe the question of whether one agrees or disagrees with General Petraeus’ assessment that there is no military solution to the wide range of complicated problems can be answered with a simple “yes” or “no.” Instead of outright disagreeing with him – as I do believe there is an Iraqi military option to solve these same problems – I will qualify his statements in the context of the Bush administration’s goals for this mismanaged, ill-planned, and murderous venture into Iraq. General Petraeus obviously means that far more is needed than a military solution to achieve everything the Bush administration and most neo-conservative observers believe can be achieved when the final curtain has closed and America has claimed “victory” in the country. However, looking beyond the simple pipe dreams current American presidential administration (and much of Congress) propagates, it is clear to see that a military solution does exist to overcome the present and future problems facing Iraq. This solution will be planned and executed by strong-willed, ideological Iraqis who believe it is their duty to rise up against foreign elements causing trouble in their country (the American occupation included) and regain total control of their homeland. Maliki does indeed have a military solution to the problems facing him as Prime Minister. That solution is simple: by utilizing elements of the Iraq Security Force and various local militias loyal to the PM, Maliki can assert his will, bypass the broken, partisan, and dead-locked Iraqi legislature, and fight those who oppose him in the streets of Iraq. The military solution is a civil war Maliki believes he can win – mainly due to his ability to use some loyal militias he’s supposed to be disarming and the availability of American weaponry to forces loyal to him. It is currently unclear if Maliki could use force to become the next Iraq strongman, how long it would take him to consolidate total power over Iraq, and how Maliki’s rule would affect the lives of Iraqis – but it is certainly not outside the realm of possibility that Maliki believes this is possible and is considering it as a legitimate solution to the problems plaguing him and his fledgling government. This program is already being carried out in a limited way against his main Shi’a opposition leader Moqtada al-Sadr. Maliki should not be viewed as the democratic vanguard of Iraq, standing strong for liberal, secular, pro-Western Iraq. The Bush administration trumpets him as such and this is surely a gross error, one of many they continue to make. To conclude, Petraeus is not incorrect in his assertion that there is no military solution in Iraq, but he makes his comment in the very limited scope of the majority of American coverage and analysis of the Iraq War. He speaks only in reference to American political goals in Iraq, disregarding the will of Iraqis and PM Maliki.

Now to the second more consequential, debatable, and pundit-attracting part of the question. I want to make my view very clear on this matter. While there does exist an Iraqi military solution to the political problems facing Iraq, the political solutions necessary to create a stable Iraq, safe for its people, with a government marginally responsible to its people cannot be achieved through further American occupation of the country. The Iraqi people and government must be given a clear timeline for withdrawal, based not on ambiguous “benchmarks” but on simple calendar dates. 90-95% of American troops must be withdrawn to achieve reasonable political and national goals in Iraq.

The reasons for unilateral withdrawal are compelling, and the facts supporting it are plentiful. A complete American withdrawal from the country will be good for the Iraqi people. Withdrawal will bring increased legitimacy to the shaky, less-than-popular Iraqi government, greater stability and “normalcy” for Iraq’s 20 million remaining citizens, decrease factional violence, undermine foreign elements operating in the country, and provide a foundation to empower democratic forces in Iraqi society. Full withdrawal will be good for the American economy, foreign policy, and standing in the world. Ending the Iraq War by returning the country to Iraqis will be righting a massive wrong and will begin to restore trust in the United States – especially in the Middle East where we need it most.

The costs of continuing this useless military venture are staggering: $10 billion, 180-200 American military personnel, and approximately 3000 Iraqis dead every month. Since the invasion in 2003 the Iraqi people have suffered their own monthly (if not bi-weekly) 9/11. Roughly 1/5 of Iraqis are either dead or exiled from their homes because of the violence caused by the invasion and subsequent occupation. There are over four million refugees and as many as 650,000 Iraqis dead. The Iraqi Security Forces are well-equipped and experienced, yet their loyalties do not lie entirely with Maliki’s government. Electricity, sewage treatment, and access to safe water are still below pre-war levels. How can the Iraqi people trust American forces to secure their country when they’ve had trouble keeping the lights on and the water running? The Iraqi parliament is no closer to passing an oil sharing law than it was four years ago. Political reconciliation is simply not happening on a scale that will bring about stable democracy in the next 15 years. The Parliament does not need to confront tough issues while American forces are in the country while the US ensures Maliki’s military supremacy indefinitely. Providing a strict timeline to end the occupation of Iraq will provide a much needed impulse to the Iraqi government and especially PM Maliki. The prospect of American troops leaving the country will force him to either a.) consolidate power where he can and try to seize the country as I have talked about previously or b.) begin political reconciliation in earnest with the opposition factions and lay the groundwork for true Iraqi democracy. I believe Maliki can be persuaded (by trade agreements, military aid, economic aid, and even the threat of sanctions) to choose the latter choice. Furthermore, withdrawal will increase the legitimacy of the Iraqi government and cause moderate Iraqis who have been hesitant to support Maliki (because of his indifference to the US occupation of his country) to rally behind him. Pursuing political reconciliation and bringing opposition factions into the government will also increase the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the Iraqi people. Maliki does not need American promises to choose reconciliation over military force. He’s simply not strong enough to seize the entire country. Withdrawing before he reaches this point will insure that democracy, no matter how fragile, will have a chance to survive.

Withdrawal of American forces will also undermine the various militias, fundamentalist religious leaders, and foreign elements (such as Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia) currently running wild in Iraq. The opposition to the American occupation has become their strongest selling point to normal Iraqis and one of the major reasons citizens are supporting these groups instead of the Iraqi government. The Iraqi government appears weak, indifferent to American occupation and a puppet to the will of American foreign policy. Setting a timeline for withdrawal and the Iraqi government beginning to take a stronger stance on security (as it recently has in Basra and Sadr City) will cause moderate, nationalistic Iraqis to support Maliki instead of the militias, who will certainly be linked with the instability and violence in Iraq. The Iraqi people have had enough of this and support for these militias and leaders will wane following an American withdrawal. If the government is seen as exercising the will of Iraqis instead of the American occupiers, its strength will greatly increase. Withdrawing troops will help put this in motion.

On a related note, Arab Iraqis are now and have always been strongly nationalistic – the same cannot be generally said for Kurdish Iraqis. Just as Iraqis have fought the American occupation, so too will they fight obvious foreign influences (especially from Iran and groups like Al-Qaeda. With a strong, legitimate government to rally behind Iranian pressures can be stemmed and increasingly unpopular foreign Jihadist elements chased from the country. Continued occupation only helps Iran and foreign groups in Iraq as the populace must look to them to end the occupation instead of the American puppet government they believe is running their country. As these groups tend to be far more fundamentalist, apocalyptic, and violent than mainstream factions, religious groups, Maliki’s government, and the Iraqi people, the American occupation only increases support for fundamentalist Islam and pushes many moderate Iraqis further into the arms of the militant Islamic leaders.

Far from being only good for Iraq, withdrawal in the best option to strengthen American soft power, increase trust, and relieve the American people and economy of a massive, counter-productive burden. Occupation has undermined our power in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, decreased our ability to fight Jihadist groups where they actually are strong and able to train largely unharassed (Afghanistan and Pakistan), and strengthened Iranian influence in the region (and made it much harder to seriously press Iran and address their civilian nuclear program from a position of strength). An Iraq independent of US occupation will serve as a counter to Iranian monolithic influence in the Middle East. Ending our military venture in Iraq will increase our international standing and allow us to repair our strained relationship with our European allies and Middle Eastern friends (Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and one day Iraq) alike. Economically, $10 billion per month can be spent on a great deal else aside from occupation of a foreign country. These funds can be used at home, in Iraq to help with reconstruction (Iraqi-led reconstruction), in Afghanistan to combat Jihadist elements more effectively, to care for Iraq War veterans, and to rebuild American military forces.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly for most Americans, the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq will make the Middle East and the United States safer. The US occupation has been the greatest recruiting tool imaginable for Jihadists because it increases funding and recruiting while reinforcing their apocalyptic, violent beliefs. These groups believe the US is out to dominate the Middle East through imperialistic campaigns (Lebanon, Iraq), and colonial ventures (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iraq again). These Jihadists believe the US seeks to control Middle Eastern oil and greatly weaken or destroy Islam. We are acting just as they prophesize in Iraq. They perpetuate stories to gain recruits and funding and we only help them by making every last one of their predictions come true. Advocates of continued occupation argue that, “if we don’t fight them there, we’ll be fighting them here” (in the US presumably). This is nothing more than circular logic. Foreign militants attack American forces in Iraq for the very reason that they are foreign forces occupying a Muslim country. Iraqis will stop killing Americans when Americans stop occupying and killing Iraqis. The foreign elements are the ones our intelligence community and military must keep an eye on. Currently, these fighters are attempting to kill Americans in Iraq. If Americans leave Iraq, they may try to plan attacks inside the US – that is true. But, this is no reason to indefinitely keep Americans in Iraq. Leaving Iraq and ending the occupation will undermine the funding and recruits that are pouring into these groups and in turn, make Americans safer. The argument that a withdrawal from Iraq will be viewed as a victory for the terrorists is as stupid as it is simplistic. Groups like Al-Qaeda will view their battle in Iraq as a victory whether we withdraw tomorrow or in 100 years. They mistakenly believe we are there to destroy Islam and steal Iraqi oil. If Islam is still standing when we leave (as it certainly will be), they will claim victory. As for regular Iraqis, Middle Easterners, and the rest of the world – their views will be much different.

What I am calling for is full withdrawal of all American troops as soon as humanly possible. Barack Obama says 16 months. This is too long. If possible, we should announce our intentions to leave Iraq to the current Iraqi government in as soon as 6 months (let’s shoot for Christmas 2008). We should surely retain close diplomatic, economic, and security ties to Iraq and help them to rebuild their own country through aid packages for infrastructure, economic development, and security arrangements. This is not about placing blame for faulty intelligence, the decision to go to war, the execution of policy and strategy. This is about moving on, getting out of Iraq, saving lives, saving face, restoring trust in American foreign policy and trying to salvage the best possible outcome out of a very bad situation. We must stop viewing our occupation in terms of victory and defeat – a disgusting debate – but more in terms of what can reasonably be achieved, what serves American national security, and what will help save lives (Iraqi and American).

Monday, April 21, 2008

A Ray of Truth

Through the dark clouds of lies and misinformation swirling ominously around the Bush administration and its conduct regarding the war in Iraq, comes a single desperate ray of truth. On April 2, 2008, retired 3-Star general William Odom testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Iraq. Odom provided scathing criticisms of the Bush administration's strategy and tactics in Iraq and hotly contested the highly touted reports of the success of last year's "troop surge."

From Wikipedia:
William Eldridge Odom (born June 23, 1932) is a retired U.S. Army 3-star general, and former Director of the NSA under President Ronald Reagan, which culminated a 31 year career in military intelligence, mainly specializing in matters relating to the Soviet Union. After his retirement from the military he became a think tank policy expert and a university professor and has since became known for his outspoken criticism of the Iraq War and warrantless wiretapping of American citizens.

Here is the full transcript of General Odom's testimony:

"Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you again. The last occasion was in January 2007, when the topic was the troop surge. Today you are asking if it has worked. Last year I rejected the claim that it was a new strategy. Rather, I said, it is a new tactic used to achieve the same old strategic aim, political stability. And I foresaw no serious prospects for success.

I see no reason to change my judgment now. The surge is prolonging instability, not creating the conditions for unity as the president claims.

Last year, General Petraeus wisely declined to promise a military solution to this political problem, saying that he could lower the level of violence, allowing a limited time for the Iraqi leaders to strike a political deal. Violence has been temporarily reduced but today there is credible evidence that the political situation is far more fragmented. And currently we see violence surge in Baghdad and Basra. In fact, it has also remained sporadic and significant inseveral other parts of Iraq over the past year, notwithstanding the notable drop in Baghdad and Anbar Province.

More disturbing, Prime Minister Maliki has initiated military action and then dragged in US forces to help his own troops destroy his Shiite competitors. This is a political setback, not a political solution. Such is the result of the surge tactic.

No less disturbing has been the steady violence in the Mosul area, and the tensions in Kirkuk between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomen. A showdown over control of the oil fields there surely awaits us. And the idea that some kind of a federal solution can cut this Gordian knot strikes me as a wild fantasy, wholly out of touch with Kurdish realities.

Also disturbing is Turkey's military incursion to destroy Kurdish PKK groups in the border region. That confronted the US government with a choice: either to support its NATO ally, or to make good on its commitment to Kurdish leaders to insure their security. It chose the former, and that makes it clear to the Kurds that the United States will sacrifice their security to its larger interests in Turkey.

Turning to the apparent success in Anbar province and a few other Sunni areas, this is not the positive situation it is purported to be. Certainly violence has declined as local Sunni shieks have begun to cooperate with US forces. But the surge tactic cannot be given full credit. The decline started earlier on Sunni initiative. What are their motives? First, anger at al Qaeda operatives and second, their financial plight.

Their break with al Qaeda should give us little comfort. The Sunnis welcomed anyone who would help them kill Americans, including al Qaeda. The concern we hear the president and his aides express about a residual base left for al Qaeda if we withdraw is utter nonsense. The Sunnis will soon destroy al Qaeda if we leave Iraq. The Kurds do not allow them in their region, and the Shiites, like the Iranians, detest al Qaeda. To understand why, one need only take note of the al Qaeda public diplomacy campaign over the past year or so on internet blogs. They implore the United States to bomb and invade Iran and destroy this apostate Shiite regime. As an aside, it gives me pause to learn that our vice president and some members of the Senate are aligned with al Qaeda on spreading the war to Iran.

Let me emphasize that our new Sunni friends insist on being paid for their loyalty. I have heard, for example, a rough estimate that the cost in one area of about 100 square kilometers is $250,000 per day. And periodically they threaten to defect unless their fees are increased. You might want to find out the total costs for these deals forecasted for the next several years, because they are not small and they do not promise to end. Remember, we do not own these people. We merely rent them. And they can break the lease at any moment. At the same time, this deal protects them to some degree from the government's troops and police, hardly a sign of political reconciliation.

Now let us consider the implications of the proliferating deals with the Sunni strongmen. They are far from unified among themselves. Some remain with al Qaeda. Many who break and join our forces are beholden to no one. Thus the decline in violence reflects a dispersion of power to dozens of local strong men who distrust the government and occasionally fight among themselves. Thus the basic military situation is far worse because of the proliferation of armed groups under local military chiefs who follow a proliferating number of political bosses.

This can hardly be called greater military stability, much less progress toward political consolidation, and to call it fragility that needs more time to become success is to ignore its implications. At the same time, Prime Minister Maliki's military actions in Basra and Baghdad, indicate even wider political and military fragmentation. We are witnessing is more accurately described as the road to the Balkanization of Iraq, that is, political fragmentation. We are being asked by the president to believe that this shift of so much power and finance to so many local chieftains is the road to political centralization. He describes the process as building the state from the bottom up.

I challenge you to press the administration's witnesses this week to explain this absurdity. Ask them to name a single historical case where power has been aggregated successfully from local strong men to a central government except through bloody violence leading to a single winner, most often a dictator. That is the history of
feudal Europe's transformation to the age of absolute monarchy. It is the story of the American colonization of the west and our Civil War. It took England 800 years to subdue clan rule on what is now the English-Scottish border. And it is the source of violence in Bosnia and Kosovo.

How can our leaders celebrate this diffusion of power as effective state building? More accurately described, it has placed the United States astride several civil wars. And it allows all sides to consolidate, rearm, and refill their financial coffers at the US expense.

To sum up, we face a deteriorating political situation with an over extended army. When the administration's witnesses appear before you, you should make them clarify how long the army and marines can sustain this band-aid strategy.

The only sensible strategy is to withdraw rapidly but in good order. Only that step can break the paralysis now gripping US strategy in the region. The next step is to choose a new aim, regional stability, not a meaningless victory in Iraq. And progress toward that goal requires revising our policy toward Iran. If the president merely renounced his threat of regime change by force, that could prompt Iran to lessen its support to Taliban groups in Afghanistan. Iran detests the Taliban and supports them only because they will kill more Americans in Afghanistan as retaliation in event of a US attack on Iran. Iran's policy toward Iraq would also have to change radically as we withdraw. It cannot want instability there. Iraqi Shiites are Arabs, and they know that Persians look down on them. Cooperation between them has its limits.

No quick reconciliation between the US and Iran is likely, but US steps to make Iran feel more secure make it far more conceivable than a policy calculated to increase its insecurity. The president's policy has reinforced Iran's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, the very thing he purports to be trying to prevent.

Withdrawal from Iraq does not mean withdrawal from the region. It must include a realignment and reassertion of US forces and diplomacy that give us a better chance to achieve our aim.

A number of reasons are given for not withdrawing soon and completely. I have refuted them repeatedly before but they have more lives than a cat. Let try again me explain why they don't make
sense.

First, it is insisted that we must leave behind military training element with no combat forces to secure them. This makes no sense at all. The idea that US military trainers left alone in Iraq can be safe and effective is flatly rejected by several NCOs and junior officers I have heard describe their personal experiences. Moreover, training foreign forces before they have a consolidated political authority to command their loyalty is a windmill tilt. Finally, Iraq is not short on military skills.

Second, it is insisted that chaos will follow our withdrawal. We heard that argument as the "domino theory" in Vietnam. Even so, the path to political stability will be bloody regardless of whether we withdraw or not. The idea that the United States has a moral responsibility to prevent this ignores that reality. We are certainly to blame for it, but we do not have the physical means to prevent it. American leaders who insist that it is in our power to do so are misleading both the public and themselves if they believe it. The real moral question is whether to risk the lives of more Americans. Unlike preventing chaos, we have the physical means to stop sending more troops where many will be killed or wounded. That is the moral responsibility to our country which no American leaders seems willing to assume.

Third, nay sayers insist that our withdrawal will create regional instability. This confuses cause with effect. Our forces in Iraq and our threat to change Iran's regime are making the region unstable. Those who link instability with a US withdrawal have it exactly backwards. Our ostrich strategy of keeping our heads buried in the sands of Iraq has done nothing but advance our enemies' interest.

I implore you to reject these fallacious excuses for prolonging the commitment of US forces to war in Iraq.

Thanks for this opportunity to testify today."


So, correct me if I am wrong - General Petraeus doesn't believe there is a military solution in Iraq, yet the Bush administration isn't really doing anything beyond "staying the course." This is directly causing more American military casualties and horrific numbers of Iraqi civilian (and military) deaths while providing no political progress. Iraq is falling apart at the seams, factions are splitting into other factions, the government is desperately fighting off any opponents (not exactly paving the way to political reconciliation) and the military is bribing tribal leaders not to kill American or Iraqi government troops (which costs as much as $250,000 a day PER LEADER!) It just seems so absurd to me. Of course, our lame duck president doesn't feel any of the consequences nor does he seem to be affected by the situation HE and his administration has created and continues to blindly support.

Want another absurdity? John McCain wants to increase American forces in Iraq to help stabilize the country. The presence of the American military in Iraq and the puppet Iraqi government are the two destabilizing forces themselves. Despite the assertion of our top military man in Iraq, McCain blazes his own trail. He wants more troops for an undisputed American victory. Talk of an American "victory" in Iraq is disgusting. Who cares about victory for the occupiers? Let's talk about saving lives, ending occupation, and leaving Iraq for the Iraqis.

Want another absurdity?

Clever Comments

Recently a visitor to this blog (a Palestinian with excellent English language skills I assume) posted a comment regarding the op-ed in Haaretz entitled "10 Commandments for Israel and Palestine." I wanted to highlight his/her comments regarding the difference between Zionist and Palestinian claims.

"...[the author] sells the conflict as a 'Islam vs. Judaism', when it is anything but. It is Zionism vs. everyone who gets in their way. Palestinians are made up of Muslims, Christians and Jews. All of whom oppose the Zionist state and its occupation. This is not a trivial point. We (Muslims and Christians) do not have a faith based claim on Palestine... it is the natural claim of people living there, and who have lived for over 2 thousand years. This applies to Palestinian Jews, but I list them seperately for it is my understanding that Jews have a faith based claim on Palestine (their promised land) when the Messiah returns to release them from the exile, and to restablish Palestine. This is not the Zionist claim, not the Zionist aim in Palestine. Their aim is to establish a land for Jews, and to reenter the European domain as an independenent Jewish state and people. So that they will be respected, and be freed from the subbordinate status that the Europeans subjected them to (this is what I got from the book 'From Hertzl to Rabin: a history of Zionism'). The two claims are NOT the same."

I think this really adds a great deal to the original article and helps to clarify some of the author's statements. Thanks for the comment and analysis!